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Abstract—This letter investigates the physical layer security in
a wireless cooperative network where communication is assisted
by a full-duplex (FD) untrusted relay in the presence of multiple
external eavesdroppers. A cluster-based colluding eavesdropping
setting is considered, where illegitimate nodes with common
interests are grouped in a cluster. In order to confuse the
different eavesdropping clusters, we consider artificial-noise-
aided beamforming at the source node. Moreover, FD relay
jamming is adopted to improve the system’s security. To maintain
secure communications against the untrusted relay node, a FD
destination jamming scheme is adopted. Our proposed scheme is
designed based on the channel state information of the legitimate
nodes only. Numerical results show that the optimal power
allocation factor between data and artificial noise depends on the
total number of antennas of the different colluding eavesdropping
clusters.
Index Terms—Wiretap channel, group/cluster eavesdropping,
PHY security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eavesdropping on network traffic is one of the most critical
security attacks due to the broadcast nature of the wireless
medium. Security techniques have traditionally been consid-
ered at the higher layers of communication networks based
on cryptography. Although cryptography-based techniques
improve the computational security of the system and are
widely deployed, they do not provide information-theoretic
security guarantees and they only rely on the fact that some
mathematical problems are hard to solve at the eavesdroppers.
To meet confidentiality requirements in complex and diverse
scenarios, there has been a renewed interest in a multi-
layer wireless security solution that exploits the time-varying
nature of wireless channels at the physical layer, known as
physical layer security (PLS), with cryptography protocols
implemented at the application layer.
As proven in [1], based on PLS, a positive secrecy capacity
is achieved only when the rate of the source-eavesdropper
channel is worse than the rate of the source-destination chan-
nel. When the transmitter has multiple antennas, a widely used
secrecy approach aims at reducing the eavesdropper’s signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) by sending an artificial
noise (AN), superimpose on the data signal, into the null space
of the intended receiver’s channel matrix [2] to ensure that
only the eavesdropper’s received signal will be degraded.
For the single-antenna source scenario, by using cooperative
jamming (CJ) techniques [3], the helper nodes cooperatively
inject AN signals independent of the confidential information
signals to jam the eavesdropper nodes. Referred to as the
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destination-based jamming (DBJ) technique, the destination
can perform CJ to degrade the channel quality of an internal
eavesdropper, (such as an untrusted relay) [4], [5]. In fact,
the relay nodes can be honest but curious nodes, hence,
they are trusted at the service level but are untrusted at the
information level. The authors of [6] proposed a joint DBJ
and CJ scheme to reduce the secrecy outage probability of
wireless cooperative systems under untrusted relaying.
The common theme of the aforementioned works is based
on the fact that they mainly employ the half-duplex (HD) mode
at the relay due to its low complexity. Recent progress in self-
interference cancellation techniques paved the way to the use
of full-duplex (FD) relaying scheme as a promising spectral
efficient solution [7]. To improve the PLS, a hybrid HD/FD
relay selection technique was proposed in [8]. Recently, FD-
relaying with jamming was proposed to assist a single-antenna
source in improving the system’s secrecy capacity [9]. In
fact, in this approach, the FD relay is designed to transmit
a jamming signal to the eavesdropper while receiving the
data from the source. To achieve a positive secrecy capacity,
the authors of [10] considered an FD legitimate receiver that
simultaneously receives its intended data and sends jamming
signals to an FD untrusted relay. Unlike [10], we assume that
the transmitting nodes are equipped with multiple antennas in
the presence of external eavesdropping.
Generally, most PLS schemes are proposed against at-
tacks by either an individual eavesdropper or independently-
operating multiple eavesdroppers (i.e., non-colluding eaves-
droppers). However, the subscribed users in a network (each
with an arbitrary number of antennas) can construct collab-
orative eavesdropping clusters based on common interests
(benefits) and operate in parallel as illegitimate nodes. In other
words, there are many attacking systems and each one has its
own nodes that work for its benefits. In this case, the non-
colluding eavesdropping model may underestimate the adver-
sary’s power and fail to capture it. For an ideal attack strategy,
when multiple eavesdroppers coexist, they may share their
signal observations to make the eavesdropping attack more
efficient (i.e., colluding eavesdroppers) [11]. Furthermore, for
collaboration purposes, eavesdroppers can be classified by
the type of their attacks, their geographic locations, or any
beneficial incentives.
To the best of our knowledge, the cluster-based colluding
eavesdropping model has not been studied in the literature
before. In addition, we investigate the secrecy performance
of the untrusted FD relay network in the presence of multi-
ple external clusters of eavesdroppers. Our contributions are
summarized as follows
• We consider the most general case of eavesdropping
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2attacks and assume that multiple external eavesdropping
nodes coexist with the FD untrusted relay. Furthermore,
we assume that these eavesdropping nodes are organized
into clusters and that attackers within the same cluster
collude with each other to design joint attack.
• To achieve positive secrecy, we propose a new scheme to
secure the source transmissions and derive the achievable
secrecy rate. In our proposed scheme, the destination
operates in the FD mode to be able to receive its intended
data signal while jamming the untrusted relay. On the
other hand, the multi-antenna nodes, the source and the
relay, send jamming signals along the null space of
the relay and the destination channel, respectively, to
confound all eavesdroppers in the different clusters.
Notation: Unless otherwise stated, lower- and upper-case
bold letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively. IN
denotes the identity matrix whose size is N × N . 0M×N
denotes the zero matrix whose size is M ×N CM×N denotes
the set of all complex matrices of size M × N . (·)∗ denotes
the Hermitian conjugate of a matrix. 0M×N denotes the all-
zero matrix with size M ×N . θ= 1 − θ. blkd = {·} denotes
a diagonal matrix with the enclosed elements as its diagonal
elements. [·]+ = max{·, 0} denotes the maximum between the
value in the argument and zero.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider secure communication between a transmitter
(Alice) and an FD receiver (Bob) through an FD amplify-and-
forward (AF) untrusted relay node (Ray), in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers. Alice (A), Bob (B) and Ray (R) are
assumed to be equipped with one receive and multiple transmit
antennas. We denote the number of transmit antennas at node
j as Nj where j ∈ {A,R,B}. We assume that the multiple
alien/external eavesdroppers are located in the radio-frequency
(RF) range of Alice, Bob and Ray. As shown in Fig. 1, we fur-
ther assume that, according to their interdependent behaviors,
the eavesdroppers are divided into M different clusters/groups,
(Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M ). Eavesdroppers within the same cluster
can jointly process their received information signals, which
makes the security issue more challenging. We denote the total
number of antennas of eavesdroppers belonging to the cluster
Gi as Nei . We assume that the legitimate nodes do not have
knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ channel state information
(CSI), This is reasonable since the eavesdroppers are passive
nodes that try to access information of the legitimate nodes.
The legitimate transmitters know the CSI of their own links
to their respective receivers.
Alice transmits her information signal, x, to Bob through
the FD relay. At the same time, Bob sends an AN signal,
denoted by zB, to confuse Ray so that he is not able to
decode Alice’s data. The jamming signal from Bob, which is
also embedded in Ray’s forwarded signal, will only hurt the
eavesdroppers. When Ray forwards the signal to Bob, the AN
can be canceled out. This will secure the transmissions from
both alien eavesdropping and from the untrusted relay. All the
eavesdroppers are able to hear all transmissions. To secure her
transmission, Alice will assign a portion of her power, θA, for
data and the rest, θA, to send an AN signal denoted by zA.
A B
R
Eavesdroppers in cluster ?? 
Eavesdroppers in cluster ?? 
Eavesdroppers in cluster ?? 
Fig. 1. A two-hop cooperative communication network with a wireless un-
trusted relay node. In the figure, we show an example of three eavesdropping
clusters.
The AN signal from Alice is designed to be canceled at Ray
to avoid forwarding the interference to Bob. Furthermore, Ray
uses a part of his own power to send an AN signal, denoted
by zR, orthogonal to the Ray-Bob channel vector. This AN
signal will only jam the alien eavesdroppers. The data power
ratio at R is denoted by θR.
Time is partitioned into slots each with a duration of T .
The channel has a bandwidth of W . We assume a block-
fading channel model where the channel coefficients remain
constant during a time slot (coherence time) duration, but
change independently from one time slot duration to another.
We assume that hij ∈ C1×Ni denotes the channel vector
between node i, (i ∈ {A,B,R}), and node j, (j ∈ {B,R}).
The channel matrix between node i, (i ∈ {A,B,R}), and
the multiple colluding eavesdroppers within cluster Gj is
denoted by Gji ∈ CN
e
j ×Ni . The thermal noises at Bob, Ray
and eavesdroppers are modeled as zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) vectors with powers κB, κR and κE
Watts, respectively.
III. SECRECY RATE OF PROPOSED SCHEME
According to the described scheme, the transmit vectors by
Alice and Bob are given by
sA = ainfx+AANzA and sB = BANzB, (1)
respectively, where ainf ∈ CNA×1 is the data precoding vector
at Alice, AAN ∈ CNA×(NA−1) is the precoding matrix of the
AN vector zA ∈ C(NA−1)×1 designed to be orthogonal to the
Alice-to-relay channel vector, i.e., hARAAN = 01×(NA−1),
and BAN ∈ CNB×(NB−1) is designed at Bob to be orthog-
onal to his self-interference channel vector, i.e., hBBBAN =
01×(NB−1). Thus, the received signal at Ray is given by
yR = hARainfx+ hBRBANzB + nR (2)
where nR ∈ C is the AWGN signal at Ray’s receiver. In
order to maximize the SINR at Ray, the precoding vector ainf
should be equal to h
∗
AR
‖hAR‖ . Simultaneously, Ray transmits the
following signal to Bob
sRB = wRyR +WANzR (3)
where wR ∈ CNR×1 is the transmit precoder vector used at
Ray, and WAN ∈ CNR×(NR−2) is the precoding matrix of
zR ∈ C(NR−2)×1 which nulls the self-interference at Ray
and Bob. Thus, hRBWAN = 01×(NR−2) and hRRWAN =
01×(NR−2). To avoid system instability, where all the previ-
ously transmitted data symbols are amplified and forwarded
over time, we have to set hRRwR = 0. Consequently, we
3assume zero-forcing processing for the signal transmitted by
Ray at his own receiver. Under this constraint, the precoding
vector wR is designed to maximize the power received at Bob,
while canceling out the self-interference at Ray. Following
[12], wR can be computed by solving the following optimiza-
tion problem
max
wR
|hRBwR|, s.t. |hRRwR| = 0, ‖wR‖2 = 1, (4)
and is given by
wR =
Ψh∗RB
‖Ψh∗RB‖
, (5)
where Ψ = INR − h
∗
RRhRR
‖hRR‖2 . Then, (3) can written as
sRB = wR|hAR|x+wRhBRBANzB +wRnR +WANzR. (6)
Therefore, the received signal at Bob is given by
yB = hRBwR|hAR|x+ hRBwRhBRBANzB + hRBwRnR + nB .
(7)
Hence, the achievable rate of the legitimate system is given by
RAB = log2
(
1 +
|hRBwR|2|hAR|2θAPAθRPR
|hRBwR|2κR + κB
)
, (8)
where PA and PR are the transmit powers at Alice and Ray,
respectively. Moreover, Ray’s interception rate is given by
RAR = log2 det
(
1 +
|hAR|2θAPA
|hBRBAN|2PB + κR
)
. (9)
Each alien eavesdropper receives two versions of the same
symbol but shifted by one time symbol processing delay
(due to delay in processing at Ray). Hence, after exchanging
and combining information signals, the received signal at the
eavesdroppers in cluster Gi is given by
yGi(t) = G
i
Aainfx(t) +G
i
AAANzA(t) +G
i
BBANzB(t)
+GiRwR|hAR|x(t− 1) +GiRwRhARAANzA(t− 1)
+GiRwRnR(t− 1) +GiRWANzR(t)
+GiRwRhBRBANzB(t− 1) + nEi(t),
(10)
where nEi is the AWGN signal vector at the eavesdroppers
belonging to Gi. For better data interception, each cluster
of eavesdroppers needs to rearrange the received signals and
decode the entire signal as a single block. Specifically, the
received signal at the colluding eavesdroppers in Gi is
y˜Gi = blkd{GiAainf ,GiAainf , . . . ,GiAainf}x˜
+ blkd{GiAAAN,GiAAAN, . . . ,GiAAAN}z˜A
+ blkd{GiBBAN,GiBBAN, . . . ,GiBBAN}z˜B
+ blkd{GiRwR|hAR|, . . . ,GiRwR|hAR|}Sx˜
+ blkd{GiRwRhARAAN, . . . ,GiRwRhARAAN}Sz˜A
+ blkd{GiRwR,GiRwR, . . . ,GiRwR}n˜R
+ blkd{GiRWAN, . . . ,GiRWAN}z˜R
+ blkd{GiRwRhBRBAN, . . . ,GiRwRhBRBAN}Sz˜B + n˜Ei ,
(11)
where S = [01×B; [I(B−1)]1:B] is a matrix with an all-zero
vector as its first row and the rows of the identity matrix on
the other rows, B = bWT c is the block size of the code-
word, x˜ = [x(0), x(1), . . . , x(B)], z˜A = [zA(0), . . . , zA(B)]
with x(0) = 0, n˜R = [nR(0), nR(1), . . . , nR(B)], z˜R =
[zR(0), . . . , zR(B)] and z˜B = [zB(0), . . . , zB(B)]. The signal
vector in (11) can be rewritten as
y˜Gi = Dx˜+CAz˜A +CRz˜R +CBz˜B
+ blkd{GiRwR, . . . ,GiRwR}n˜R + n˜Ei ,
(12)
where D, CA, CR and CB are given in (13) at the top of the
next page.
Based on (8), (9) and (14), the achievable secrecy rate for
the proposed scheme is given by
Rsec =
[
RAB −max{RAR, max
1≤i≤M
RGi}
]+
. (15)
We assume that Ray and the different clusters of eavesdroppers
process their received signals independently and only eaves-
droppers in the same cluster collude (i.e., jointly process their
received signals).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to evalu-
ate the achieved secrecy rate of our proposed scheme in a
Rayleigh fading environment where the channel coefficients
are circularly-symmetric Gaussian random variables with zero
mean and unit variance. We set the transmit powers of Alice,
Bob and Ray to PA = PB = PR = 10 dBm. The AWGN
power at any receiving node is normalized to 0 dBm. We
assume that each transmission block is associated with a
normalized time slot of duration T = 10 milliseconds and
bandwidth W = 1 MHz. The number of transmit antennas at
Alice, Bob and Ray are NA = NB = NR = 4. We assume
that multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers are grouped into
one cluster. Then, the total number of antennas, denoted as
NE, in the cluster is equal to the number of nodes it contains.
Figs. 2 and 3 show the achievable secrecy rate of our
proposed scheme versus the data power allocation factors,
θA and θR, at Alice and Ray, respectively, for different total
number of receive antennas, NE, of the eavesdropping cluster.
We assumed: NE = 4 and NE = 2. In both scenarios, for
fixed θA and θR, as NE increases, the average secrecy rate
decreases. Obviously, the eavesdropping cluster’s ability to
decode the information increases with the total number of its
antennas.
It is also clear that a dynamic power allocation increases
the secrecy rate of our proposed scheme. As shown in Fig. 3,
the optimal values of θA and θR are close to 1. The reason is
that when NE is small, the eavesdropping nodes, even with
collusion, do not have enough ability to decode the received
signals that are combined with Bob’s jamming signal. In this
case, the untrusted relay with a single receive antenna will
be more powerful to eavesdrop the data signal. Hence, in
such cases, Bob’s jamming signal is enough to achieve secure
transmission and Alice and Ray should allocate more power
to transmit data signals to increase the achievable rate at Bob.
However in Fig. 2, when NE = 4, the eavesdropping cluster
is more powerful than the untrusted relay and becomes a
threat to secrecy transmission. Thus, the eavesdropping SINR
dominates in the secrecy rate expression. Therefore, Alice
and Ray should carefully use some of their available transmit
powers to send jamming signals. As shown in Fig. 2, the
optimal values of θA and θR are between 40% and 75% and
between 80% and 100%, respectively. Furthermore, we can
4D = blkd{GiAainf , . . . ,GiAainf}+ blkd{GiRwR|hAR|, . . . ,GiRwR|hAR|}S,
CA = blkd{GiAAAN, . . . ,GiAAAN}+ blkd{GiRwRhARAAN, . . . ,GiRwRhARAAN}S,
CR = blkd{GiRWAN, . . . ,GiRWAN},
CB = blkd{GiBBAN, . . . ,GiBBAN}+ blkd{GiRwRhBRBAN, . . . ,GiRwRhBRBAN}.
(13)
RGi =
1
B log2 det
(
IB+θRPADD
∗ (
θAPACAC
∗
A+θRPRCRC
∗
R+PBCBC
∗
B+κE
(
IB+blkd{GiRwR, . . . ,GiRwR}blkd{GiRwR, . . . ,GiRwR}∗
))−1)
.
(14)
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Fig. 2. The achievable secrecy rate versus θA and θR when NE = 4.
see that Alice should expend more jamming power than the
untrusted relay. In fact, the noise signal and Bob’s jamming
signal are amplified at Ray. Hence, when θR increases, the
jamming noise at the eavesdropping cluster increases while
Bob’s rate increases as well. On the other hand, along with
DBJ, transmitting AN from Alice, i.e., θA 6= 1, is needed to
protect her own transmissions.
V. CONCLUSION
We analyzed the PLS of FD untrusted relay networks in the
presence of multiple external clusters of colluding eavesdrop-
pers. We proposed an AN-aided secure transmission scheme
in which the untrusted relay and the destination cooperate
with the source to confound the eavesdroppers and the relay,
respectively, by generating AN signals. Our numerical results
quantified the secrecy rate gains of the AN and the negative
impact of increasing the total number of antennas of the
eavesdroppers clusters. We showed that the optimal values of
the power factor at Alice, θA, and the power factor at the relay,
θR, are between 40% and 75% and between 80% and 100%,
respectively. When the total number of receive antennas in the
eavesdropping clusters is small, almost all the power should
be allocated to the information signal at both the source and
the relay. However, more jamming power is required as the
number of the eavesdropping cluster’s antennas increases.
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